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Abstract
Many organizations specify complex information release
policies to describe the terms under which sensitive infor-
mation may be released to organizations outside of their
control. In this paper, we present AIR, a formal language
for describing information release policies in terms of se-
curity automata. Each automaton’s state transitions cor-
respond to conditions that must be satisﬁed before infor-
mation may be released, and released information may be
optionally downgraded. We give a semantics to AIR poli-
cies by translating them into an API for programs written
in lAIR, a core formalism for a purely functional program-
ming language. Through its use of dependent, singleton,
and afﬁne types, lAIR’s type system assists in the proof
that programs use an AIR policy API correctly. Our work
takes an important step toward building software, such as
so-called cross-domain guards, that can be veriﬁed to cor-
rectly enforce high-level information release policies.
1 Introduction
Many organizations, including ﬁnancial institutions,
healthcare providers, the military, and even the organizers
of this conference, wish to specify the terms under which
sensitive information in their possession can be released to
their partners, clients, or the public. Such a speciﬁcation
constitutes an information release policy.
Intherealworld, suchpoliciescanbequitecomplex. For
example, consider the policy that regulates the disclosure of
military information to foreign governments as deﬁned by
the United States Department of Defense [1992]. The terms
of this policy place restrictions on who may authorize a dis-
closure, what information may be released, when the dis-
closure is allowed to take place and where in the system the
disclosure is to occur. In particular, a release must be autho-
rized by an ofﬁcial with disclosure authority who represents
the “DoD Component that originated the information.” The
system must “edit or rewrite data packages to exclude in-
formation that is beyond that which has been authorized for
disclosure.” Additionally, a disclosure shall not occur until
the foreign government has submitted “a security assurance
[:::] on the individuals who are to receive the information.”
The release must take place in the Foreign Disclosure and
Technical Information System and both approvals and de-
nials of the release request must be logged in that system.
We would like to be able to construct programs that can
be shown to correctly enforce these kinds of information re-
lease policies. Software built today often falls short of this
goal. For example, consider the Data Sync Guard [Focke
et al., 2006, Fletcher et al., 2006], a commodity applica-
tion designed to mediate the “transfer of data between sys-
tems that reside on separate system-high networks at differ-
ent classiﬁcation levels.” This cross-domain guard is essen-
tially a conﬁgurable packet ﬁlter that supports the checking
of various data formats and can perform “sophisticated dirty
word/clean word searches.” As the last line of defense be-
tween the two networks, we would like such a guard to do
much more: it should verify that all of the obligations of
the high-level policy have been fulﬁlled (perhaps by other
components in the system) prior to the actual disclosure of
information. Moreover, we would like to show that such a
guard is implemented correctly: that it will not fail to verify
an obligation due to a programming mistake.
Asa steptowardreachingthese goals, thispaper presents
a formal language for specifying information release poli-
cies, and shows how such policies can be correctly enforced
in a programming language. Our key insight is that infor-
mation release policies can be naturally speciﬁed as secu-
rity automata [Schneider, 2000]. In particular, satisfying a
policy obligation corresponds to transitioning an automa-
ton toward its accepting state, which, if reached, allows in-
formation to be downgraded and released. We present a
novel technique for correctly implementing such policies:
we compile each automaton to an API that we can prove a
type-correct program must use correctly.
We call our formal policy language AIR, for “automata
for information release” (Section 2). An AIR policy con-
sists of a series of class declarations. Each class represents
an access policy—within programs, sensitive data are as-
sociated with instances of a class to indicate they are pro-
tected by that class’s policy. A class has two policy-relevant
elements: a protection level (e.g., Secret) and a security
automaton that deﬁnes how information may be released
1to the protection of a different class. The transitions be-
tween automata states are attendant on certain conditions
being fulﬁlled, e.g., that the release has been authorized by
a trusted authority, or that the release request has been prop-
erly logged. If the automata reaches an accepting state, the
data can be potentially downgraded as it is released, e.g.,
by ﬁltering portions of it or encrypting it. Thus our classes
deﬁne forms of edit automata [Ligatti et al., 2003].
To ensure that software uses AIR policies correctly, we
have designed a core programming language calculus lAIR
(Sections 3 and 4), where each AIR class is compiled to a
lAIR program API (Section 5). Using this API, program-
mers can create instances of AIR classes and use them as
a kind of dynamic label to protect sensitive data. Program-
mers call API functions to construct evidence that release
obligations have been satisﬁed, and provide this evidence
to other API functions that transition a class instance to-
ward its accepting state. Using a combination of dependent,
afﬁne, and singleton types, lAIR’s type system assists in the
proof that programs use the API correctly. In particular, if
the sequence of automaton transitions or releases that oc-
curs during a program’s evaluation constitutes a trace, then
for a type-correct program the trace must be a word in the
language accepted by the security automaton (Section 5.4).
Our approach has several beneﬁts. First, AIR policies
are separated from the programs that use them. Thus they
can be understood in isolation which is extremely important
for complex policies. By contrast, most related work for
provably enforcing release policies typically expresses poli-
cies within the security labels embedded in a program. Sec-
ond, AIR policies are highly expressive. Generally speak-
ing, edit automata can be used to enforce a large class of
safety properties as well as some liveness properties [Bauer
et al., 2002]. More particularly, related work considers ei-
ther release conditions [Chong and Myers, 2004] or down-
grading functions [Hicks et al., 2006, Li and Zdancewic,
2005], and limits the use of dynamic information and side
effects. By contrast, AIR policies support arbitrary condi-
tions and downgrading functions. One reason related works
are less expressive is their desire to prove some extensional
property about programs that release information, e.g., a
variant of noninterference [Sabelfeld and Sands, 2005].
However, consensus on such a property remains elusive, so
wefeelitisappropriatetoexploremeanstoexpressandcor-
rectly enforce policies that are coming into practical use. In
fact, our work complements noninterference-oriented inter-
pretations of information release. For example, additional
support for robust declassiﬁcation [Zdancewic and Myers,
2001] could ensure that information release is never per-
formed under the inﬂuence of an adversary, but when it
is released, it always follows the prescription of the high-
level AIR policy. Further discussion of related work can be
found in Section 6.
Metavariables
id class and rule ids P principals
C state constructors n;i; j integers x;y;z variables
Core language
Declarations D ::= class id = (principal:P; states:
  !
S ;
  !
R)
States S ::= C j C of   ! t
Rules R ::= id : R j id : T
Release R ::= When G release e with next state A
Transition T ::= When G do e with next state A
Guards G ::= x requested for use at y and
      !
9x:t:C
Conditions C ::= A1 IsClass A2 j A1 InState A2
j A1 ActsFor A2 j A1  A2
Atoms A ::= n j x j id j P j C(
  !
A) j A1+A2
j Self j Class(A) j Principal(A)
e is an expression and t is a type in lAIR. (cf. Figure 5)
Figure 1. Syntax of AIR
2 Security Automata for Information Release
This section presents the syntax of AIR, a running ex-
ample, and discussion of possible extensions.
2.1 Overview and Formal Syntax
An AIR policy consists of one or more class declara-
tions. A program will contain instances of a class, where
each instance protects some sensitive data. Protected data
can be accessed in two ways. First, each class C has an
owning principal P such that P and all who act for P may
access data protected by an instance of C. Second, each
class deﬁnes a release policy by which its protected data
can be released to an instance of different class. The re-
lease policy is expressed using rules that deﬁne a security
automaton [Schneider, 2000].
Generally speaking, a security automaton is a (poten-
tially inﬁnite) state machine in which the states represent
security-relevant conﬁgurations and transitions between the
states occur whenever some security-sensitive operation
takes place. Certain operations are permissible only in spe-
ciﬁc states. In the case of AIR, the security automaton de-
ﬁnes conditions that must hold before data can be released.
Each class instance consists of its current state, and each
condition that is satisﬁed transitions the automaton to the
next state. These transitions ultimately end in a release rule
whichallowsdatatobereleasedtoadifferentclassinstance.
Release rules allow the data to be downgraded before it is
released and both forms of rules can perform additional ac-
tions like logging. Because sensitive data is associated with
instances rather than classes, we allow multiple resources to
be governed by the same policy template (i.e., the automa-
ton deﬁned by the class) but allow release decisions to be
made independently for each.
The formal syntax for AIR policies is presented in Fig-
ure 1. We explain the syntax while stepping through a sim-
2class Alice Conﬁdential =
principal : Alice; states : Init;
Conf secret :
When x requested for use at d and
Class(d) IsClass Alice Secret
release x with next state Self;
Figure 2. A simple AIR policy
ple example, shown in Figure 2. Throughout, we use the
notation   ! a to stand for the ordered sequence a1;:::;an.
Where the context is clear, we will also treat   ! a as the set
fa1;:::;ang, or the inﬁnite series a1;a2:::.
Aclassdeclarationconsistsofaclassidentiﬁerid, aprin-
cipal identiﬁer P for the owning principal, a list
  !
S of the
automaton states, and ﬁnally a sequence of rules
  !
R that de-
ﬁne the automaton transitions. Our example declares a sin-
gle class with identiﬁer Alice Conﬁdential, owned by principal
Alice. For simplicity, our examples use a ﬂat namespace
for class identiﬁers, and abstract names to represent princi-
pals. In practice more structured namespaces could be used,
along with more complex models of principal identity, such
as X.509 certiﬁcates [Adams and Farrell, 1999].
Automaton states
  !
S are represented by terms con-
structed from an algebraic datatype whose constructors are
drawnfromthesetC. Theexamplehasbutasinglestatede-
ﬁned by the nullary constructor Init which represents the ini-
tial state of the automaton; all classes must have this state.
Constructors of the form C of   ! t may carry data as indi-
cated by the types   ! t . For example, the policy presented
in the next subsection deﬁnes a state Debt of Int where Debt
is a unary constructor whose argument has type Int. Types
t (such as Int) are drawn from the programming language
lAIR in which programs using AIR policies are written;
lAIR is discussed in the next section.
Each rule in the rule set
  !
R is given a name id, and is
either a release rule R or a transition rule T. In both cases,
a rule begins with a guard G.
A guard G always begins by stating that a rule applies
when data x is requested for use at the protection level de-
scribed by an instance y of some class (typically this class is
different from the current one). G also includes a conjunc-
tion of condition expressionsC that restrict the applicability
of a rule; we discuss these in more detail below. Following
its guard, the rule speciﬁes an lAIR expression e that can
either release information (after downgrading it by ﬁltering
or encryption) or do some other action (like logging the re-
lease), depending on whether the rule is a release rule or a
transition rule. A rule concludes with the next state of the
automaton following the release, speciﬁed as an atom A.
Our example Alice Conﬁdential class includes a single re-
lease rule Conf secret. The initial part of the rule’s guard
indicates that it applies when data protected by an instance
of this class is to be released to some class instance d. This
class US Army Conﬁdential =
principal : US Army; states : Init; Debt of Int;
Conf init :
When x requested for use at d and
Self InState Init
do with next state Debt(0)
Conf secret :
When x requested for use at d and
Class(d) IsClass US Army Secret
release x with next state Self;
Conf coalition :
When x requested for use at d and
Principal(Class(d)) ActsFor Coalition;
9count:Int:Self InState Debt(count);
count  10
release
(log(:::x:::d);encrypt (pubkey (principal (class d))) x)
with next state Debt(count +1)
Figure 3. A risk-adaptive policy in AIR
is allowed under the condition Class(d) IsClass Alice Secret,
which states that d must be an instance of the Alice Secret
class. When this condition is true, the release expression e
is simply the variable x, which indicates that the protected
data can be released without modiﬁcation. Finally, the au-
tomaton transitions to state Self, the state it is already in.
We have picked a small ontology for condition ex-
pressions C based on integers, principals, classes and
their instances. In a list of condition expressions
9x1:t1:C1;:::;9xn:tn:Cn, each xi is a variable of type ti and
is in scope as far to the right as possible, until the end of
the rule. We will omit the 9x:t preﬁx if x is not free in
some condition C. Condition expressions C are typed bi-
nary predicates over atoms A; i.e., A1 ActsFor A2 is deﬁned
for Principal-typed atoms. It asserts that the atom A1 acts
for A2 according to some acts-for hierarchy among princi-
pals which is not explicitly modeled here. Atoms include
integers n, variables x, identiﬁers id, principal constants
P, state literals constructed from an application of a state
constructor C to a list of atoms, addition of integers and
the implicit variable Self. We also include two operators:
Class(A) retrieves the class of its argument A, a class in-
stance, and Principal(C) retrieves the principal that owns
the classC.
2.2 A Risk-adaptive policy in AIR
Figure 3 contains a larger AIR policy that illustrates all
of the language’s features. This policy can be thought of
as implementing a simple kind of risk-adaptive access con-
trol [Cheng et al., 2007], in which information is released
according to a risk budget, with the intention of quantifying
the risks vs. the beneﬁts of releasing sensitive information.
Our example policy is very simple. The only class def-
3inition shown is US Army Conﬁdential, whose instances are
meant to protect conﬁdential data owned by the U.S. Army.
This class associates a ﬁxed risk debt with each secure re-
source, as reﬂected in the state Debt of Int. Each time infor-
mation about the resource is released we estimate the risk
associated with that release, and add that risk to our debt.
In the example, there are two possible release targets. If
the class to which we are releasing the data is owned by a
Coalition partner, then there is some risk involved, so we
add one to our risk debt (rule Conf coalition). On the other
hand, if we are releasing to class US Army Secret, then we
assume there is no risk since this is a higher classiﬁcation
level within our organization. In this case the data is simply
released and the debt is left unaltered. When the total risk
debt exceeds a threshold then further releases to coalition
partners are not allowed. We might also provide means to
lower the risk debt, based on observed beneﬁts from having
released information to coalition partners.
We now examine each of the rules in more detail. The
Conf init rule is a transition rule that applies when process-
ing a release request from any instance d. This rule can be
thought of as the class “constructor,” applying when the au-
tomaton is in the Init state (condition Self InState Init). The
“do” expression simply transitions the automaton into the
Debt(0) state, which initializes the risk budget to 0.
The Conf secret rule is the same as the one discussed ear-
lier for Figure 2: if the information is to be released to class
US Army Secret the no addition to the risk debt is imposed
and the information is released without modiﬁcation.
Finally, the Conf coalition rule allows information to
be released to a coalition partner. In particular, if
the release target class is owned by a principal that
acts for the Coalition (expressed by the ﬁrst condition
Principal(Class(d)) ActsFor Coalition), then information
canbereleasedonlyifthecurrentriskdebthasnotexceeded
the budget, as expressed in the latter two conditions. The
ﬁrst of these requires the current state of the automaton to
be Debt(count), where count is variable with type Int which
characterizes the current risk debt. The last condition re-
quires that count is not above the preallocated risk budget
of 10. With these conditions satisﬁed, Conf coalition logs the
fact that a release has been authorized and permits release
of the data after it has been downgraded using an encryption
function. In this case, the downgrading expression encrypts
x with the public key of the principal that owns the instance
d. After the release has taken place, the state of the automa-
ton is transitioned to the Debt(count+1) state, indicating an
increment in the risk debt of this instance.
2.3 From AIR to CDL
AIR is the core of what will ultimately become a full-
featured policy language we call CDL [Thomas et al.,
2008]. The full language will include features necessary
1 let a1, debt = ... ( automaton instance, risk debt ) ... in
2 let x a1, y a1 = ... ( secrets protected by automaton a1 ) in
3 let a2, channel = get request () in
4 ( generating evidence of policy compliance )
5 let a2, a2 class = get class a2 in
6 let ev1 = acts for (principal a2 class) Coalition in
7 let a1, ev2 = in state a1 (Debt(debt)) in
8 let ev3 = leq debt 10 in
9 ( supplying evidence to policy API and releasing data )
10 let a1’, a2, x a2 = Conf coalition a1 x a1 a2 ev1 ev2 ev3 in
11 send channel x a2
Figure 4. Programming with an AIR policy
for engineering large-scale policies, including support for
various certiﬁcate and principal formats, structured names-
paces, class parameterization to support policy reuse, a
more full-featured ontology for conditions, and means to
deﬁne and share global state. These extensions do not
change the essence of AIR—that release policies can be
usefully expressed as conditional transition rules and re-
lease functions that deﬁne a security automaton.
Though it remains for us to ﬂesh out the full language
and develop larger policies, we are conﬁdent that the ba-
sic core of using security automata, as expressed by AIR,
will remain unchanged, for two reasons. First, automata-
based policies are theoretically quite expressive: Bauer
et al. [2002] prove that a wide class of safety properties and
some liveness properties can be enforced by edit automata.
Second, we have examined larger policies (such as ones in
use by the Future Combat Systems initiative of the United
States Army [2008] and the DoD generally) and studied
work on fuller-featured formal policy languages that aim to
model the privacy of medical records [Becker and Sewell,
2004, May et al., 2006], and found that security automata
can express the core ideas of information release these poli-
cies and languages express. Keeping AIR simple allows us
to illustrate precisely our main contribution: how automata-
based information release policies can be instantiated in a
programming language such that programs using the pol-
icy can be veriﬁed as doing so correctly. By contrast, prior
work on high-level policy languages focuses on the policy
only, not on assuring its correct enforcement.
3 A Programming Model for AIR
Given a particular AIR policy, we would like to verify
that the possible executions of programs that correctly use
that policy enjoy a security-relevant property. Toward this
end, we have deﬁned a programming language called lAIR
in which one writes programs that use AIR policies, where
lAIR’stypesystemensuresthesepoliciesareusedcorrectly.
The rest of this section deﬁnes the programming model for
this language and the next two sections ﬂesh out its syn-
tax and semantics. Section 5.4 proves that type-correct pro-
grams act only in accordance with their AIR policies.
4The programming model for using AIR policies has two
elements. First, programmers can create AIR class in-
stances within a program and associate each with one or
more pieces of sensitive data via a labeling. This associa-
tion deﬁnes (a) the set of principals that may view the data
(in particular, the principal P that owns the class, and any
principals that may act for P), and (b) the rules that allow
the data to be released. Second, programmers interact with
AIR class instances through a class-speciﬁc API to provide
evidence that the necessary conditions to release protected
data have been met. We create this API by compiling each
AIR class deﬁnition to a series of program-level deﬁnitions.
For example, each AIR class’s release and transition rules
are compiled to functions. To apply a rule, the program in-
vokes the function passing in the relevant class instance and
any necessary evidence as arguments.
Figure 4 illustrates a program using the the AIR policy
from Figure 3, written with ML-like notation. At a high
level, this program receives requests for information on a
channel. Before disclosing the information, it must make
sure that the automaton that protects the data is in a state
thatpermitstherelease. Theﬁrstlineoftheprogramdeﬁnes
the variable a1 which represents an automaton instance, and
the variable debt which stands for the total risk debt associ-
ated with a1. The second line deﬁnes two secret values x a1
and y a1 which are both intended to be protected by the au-
tomaton a1. Only the principals that act for the owner of
the class of a1 can view these secrets. The third line of the
program blocks until a request is received. The request con-
sists of an output channel and another automaton instance
a2 that represents the policy under which the requested in-
formation will be protected after the release. In effect, the
information, once released, will be under the protection of
the principal that owns the class of a2.
Prior to responding to the request, on lines 5-8 we estab-
lish that a1 is in a state that permits the release. At line 5
we extract the class of the instance a2. At line 6 we check
that the owner of a2’s class acts for the Coalition principal
and, if this check succeeds, we obtain a certiﬁcate ev1 as
evidence of this fact. At lines 7 and 8 we check that the
automaton a1 is in the appropriate Debt(debt) state where
debt is not greater than 10. If both these checks succeed,
we obtain certiﬁcates ev2 and ev3 as evidence. At line 9
we call the Conf coalition function produced by compiling
the AIR policy. We pass in the automaton a1 and the secret
data x a1; the automaton a2 to which x a1 is to be released;
and the certiﬁcates that serve as evidence for the release
conditions. Conf coalition returns a1’ which represents the
next state of the automaton (presumably in the Debt(debt+1)
state); a2 the unchanged destination automaton; and ﬁnally,
x a2, which contains the suitably downgraded secret value
ready for release. On the last line, we send the released
information on the channel received with the request.
Every time a program releases information protected by
an automaton a1 to an automaton a2 we would like to prove
that a1 is in a state that authorizes the release. Furthermore,
we want to show that all the state transitions that resulted in
a1 being in the authorizing state were justiﬁed by evidence
for the conditions speciﬁed in a1’s AIR class declaration.
lAIR’s type system was designed so that type correctness
implies correct policy use, i.e., a type-correct program uses
its AIR policy correctly. The type system has three key
elements:
Afﬁne types. The type system can be used to ensure that
each time the program calls a function like Conf coalition,
which returns back the automaton in a new state, it does not
incorrectly continue to use the old representation of the au-
tomaton. This is achieved using afﬁne types; a value having
afﬁne type can never be used more than once. Thus, we give
an automaton instance an afﬁne type !t. Passing the automa-
ton as an argument to Conf coalition constitutes a use; only
the new version, returned by the function, remains valid af-
ter the call. (It might also be possible to use references to
mutate the automaton state, but this turns out to mix poorly
with other elements of the system.)
Singleton types. Next, the type system can ensure that a
program always correctly associates data with the class in-
stance that protects it. For example, Conf coalition expects
its ﬁrst argument to be an automaton and the second to be
data protected by that automaton. In an ML-like type sys-
tem, this function’s type might begin with 8a:Instance !
a ! ::: But such a type is not sufﬁciently accurate since
it does not prescribe any relationship between the ﬁrst and
second argument, allowing the programmer to erroneously
pass in a2 as the ﬁrst argument, rather than a1, for example.
To remedy this problem, we give Conf coalition the type:
8a;N;M:!InstanceN ! Protected a N ! !InstanceM !
::: ! (!InstanceN !InstanceM Protected a M)
Here, N is a unique type-level name for the class instance
provided in the ﬁrst argument. The second argument has
type Protected a N indicates it is an a value protected by
the instance N, making clear the association between policy
and data. We can ensure that values of type Protected a N
may only be accessed by principals P that act for the owner
of the class instantiated by the instance named N. The third
argument of this function is another automaton, named M,
to which the protected data is to be released.
Now consider the return type of Conf coalition. The ﬁrst
component of this three-tuple is a class instance with the
same name N as the ﬁrst argument. This returned value is
the new state of the automaton named N it protects all ex-
isting data of type Protected a N (such as x a1 and y a1).
Because the instance passed in to Conf coalition is afﬁne (a1
in the example), it cannot be accessed after the call, ensur-
ing that the returned instance (a1’ in the example) is the
5only one available for subsequent access checks. The sec-
ond component of the three-tuple is the unchanged target
automaton. The third component contains the data ready to
be released and its type Protected a M indicates that it is
now protected by the target automaton instance M.
Dependent types. The third and fourth arguments to
Conf coalition represent certiﬁcates (evidence) that the
owner of class instance a2 acts for Coalition, and that a1
is in a state authorized to release the given data. One ques-
tion is why we are bothering to require certiﬁcates at all. We
might imagine implementing Conf coalition to check the re-
quired conditions itself rather than requiring certiﬁcates to
be passed in. This approach is inﬂexible, however, since
now Conf coalitionmustknowallpossiblewaysofverifying
these conditions, and it must have the proper context to do
so. The use of certiﬁcates allows different means to be used
for generating them, in an appropriate context. In the exam-
ple, the acts for function is called to generate a certiﬁcate,
presumably based on local information; but we could also
imagine receiving a certiﬁcate from trusted remote source.
Using certiﬁcates, Conf coalition need only ensure
that the certiﬁcates validly attest to the required condi-
tions. However, even this is not desirable, as it requires
Conf coalition to understand many possible certiﬁcate for-
mats and encodings, and various ways for verifying them. It
also requires that the veriﬁcation always occur at run-time,
even if the conditions could be veriﬁed statically, based on
the program text.
We avoid these problems by typing certiﬁcates and
rule functions using dependent types. For example, we
give the ﬁrst certiﬁcate argument in Conf coalition the type
ActsFor (principal a2 class) Coalition where ActsFor is
a dependent type constructor applied to two expressions,
principal a2 class and Coalition, where each has type Prin.
The ﬁrst expression represents the principal that owns a2’s
class and the second is the Coalition principal. Data with
type ActsFor P Q represents a certiﬁcate asserting that prin-
cipal P acts for Q. Now the Conf coalition function can
only be called with certiﬁcates having the correct type, so
there is no need for it to verify those certiﬁcates, mak-
ing its implementation easily deduced from the policy rule
(see Section 5). Functions like acts for can produce cer-
tiﬁcates at run-time based on dynamic checks, and certiﬁ-
cates could even be produced by the compiler, constituting
a static check.
4 Syntax and Semantics of lAIR
lAIR extends a core System Fw [Girard, 1972] with sup-
port for dependent types, afﬁne types, and singleton types.
lAIR is parameterized by a signature S that deﬁnes base
terms B and type constructors T, most of which are AIR-
speciﬁc—each AIR classdeclarationDiscompiledtoasig-
nature SD that acts as the API for programs that use D. All
Metavariables
B Base terms T Type constructors a;b;g Type vars
Core language
Terms e ::= x j lx:t:e j e e j La::k:e j e [t] j B
j e feg j case e of   ! x:t:e : e else e j ? j new e
Types t ::= a j (x:t)
e !t j 8a::k:t j T
j t )t j qt jt t jt e jta
Afﬁnity q ::= ! j 
Simple kinds k ::= A jU j N
Kinds K ::= k j k ! K jt ! K
Effects e ::=  j a j e ]e j e [e
Signatures and typing environments
Signatures S ::= (B:t) j (T::K) j S;S
Type env. G ::= x:t j a::k j G;G
Afﬁne env. A ::= x j A;A
Figure 5. Syntax of lAIR
AIR classes share some elements in common, like integers,
which appear in a prelude signature S0. We explain the core
of lAIR using examples from the prelude. The next section
describes the remainder of the prelude and shows how our
example AIR policy is compiled.
4.1 Syntax
Figure 5 shows the syntax of lAIR. The core language
expressions e are mostly standard, including variables x,
lambda abstractions lx:t:e, application e e0, type abstrac-
tion La::k:e and type application e [t]. Type variables a
and universally-quantiﬁed types 8a::k:t are standard; the
latterstandsforatypet thatisuniversallyquantiﬁedoverall
types a of kind k. Functions have dependent type (x:t)
e !t0
where x names the argument and may be bound in t0. Func-
tion arrows are decorated with an effect e that records a set
of type names given to automaton instances that are created
when the function is applied; we discuss these later.
The signature S deﬁnes the legal base terms B and type
constructors T, mapping them to their types t and kinds K,
respectively. The prelude S0 deﬁnes several standard terms
and types, such as support for integers and pairs, which we
use to illustrate lAIR’s other type and term constructs.
The prelude includes the constructor Int to represent the
type of integers, giving it kind U, written Int::U. Kind U is
one of three simple kinds k. Types with simple kind A are
afﬁne in that the typing rules permit afﬁnely-typed terms to
be used at most once. Afﬁne types are written !t, which is
an instance of the form qt where q = !. Terms whose types
have kindU are unrestricted in their use. Kind N is given to
type names, which we explain shortly.
The prelude also deﬁnes two base terms for constructing
integers: Zero : Int represents the integer 0, while Succ :
Int ) Int is a unary data constructor that produces an Int
given an Int. Data constructor application is written e feg;
thus the integer 1 would be represented Succ fZerog (from
6here on we write integers as 0;1;2 etc. for brevity). Pro-
grams can use the expression form case e of   ! x:t:e : e else e
to destruct data constructor values using pattern matching.
This is essentially standard; details are in the appendix.
In addition to simple kinds k, kinds K more generally
can classify functional type constructors, using the forms
k !K andt !K, respectively. A type constructort1 having
the ﬁrst form can be applied to another type using t1 t2 to
produce a (standard) type, while one of the second form
can be applied to a term using t e to produce a dependent
type. As an example of the ﬁrst case, the prelude deﬁnes a
type constructor ::U !U !U to model pairs; Int Int is
the type of a pair of integers (though for clarity, from here
on we will use inﬁx notation and write a pair type as t 
t0). The prelude also deﬁnes a corresponding base term Pair
which has a polymorphic type 8a;b::U:a ) b ) a b
for constructing pair values.
Evidence for condition expressions in an AIR policy are
typed using dependent types. For instance, the prelude pro-
vides means to test inequalities A1  A2 that appear in a
policy and generate certiﬁcates that serve as evidence for
successful tests:
(LEQ::Int ! Int !U);
(leq:(x:Int) ! (y:Int) ! LEQ x y)
LEQ is a dependent type constructor that takes two expres-
sions of type Int as arguments and produces a type having
kindU. This type is used to classify certiﬁcates that witness
the inequality between the term arguments. These certiﬁ-
cates are generated by the leq function, which has a depen-
dent type: the labels x and y on the ﬁrst two arguments ap-
pear in the returned type. Thus the call leq 3 4 would return
a certiﬁcate of type LEQ 3 4 because 3 is indeed less than
4. An attempt to construct a certiﬁcate LEQ 4 3 by calling
leq 4 3 would fail at run-time, returning ? in our semantics,
which has the effect of terminating the program (we could
add support for exceptions to handle failures more grace-
fully). The signature does not include a data constructor for
the LEQ type, so its values cannot be constructed directly
by programs—the only way is by calling the leq function.
We discuss the remaining constructs—including kinds
N, singleton typesta, afﬁne type constructors new e, and ef-
fects e—in conjunction with the types rules next. A reader
familiar with dependent, singleton, and afﬁne types can
safely skip ahead to Section 5 where the remainder of the
prelude and the translation of AIR to lAIR is described.
4.2 Static semantics
Figure 6 shows the main rules from the static semantics
of lAIR, which consists of two judgments. The full seman-
tics can be found in the appendix. Both judgments are pa-
rameterized by a signature S. The main judgment giving an
expression e a type t is written G;A `S e :t;e where G is the
standard typing environment, A is a list of afﬁne assump-
tions, and effect e is the set of fresh type names generated
in e. The second judgment, G `S t :: K states that a type t is
well-formed at kind K in the environment G.
First we consider how the type system enforces the “use
at most once” property of afﬁne types. The expression
new e constructs a value having afﬁne type so long as e’s
type is unrestricted; our encoding will use this form to cre-
ate automaton instances. The type given by (T-NEW) is
also a singleton type; we discuss the signiﬁcance of this fact
shortly. Values of afﬁne type can be destructed in the same
way as values of unrestricted type. For example, notice that
(T-APP) allows e to be applied to e0 as long as e has function
type, whether or not this type is afﬁne (q is unspeciﬁed).
Because a variable may occur many times in a program,
if a value of afﬁne type is stored in a variable, there is a dan-
geritcouldbeusedmorethanonce. Thisispreventedbythe
type rules through the use of afﬁne assumptions A, which
lists the subset of variables with afﬁne type in G which have
not already been used. The use of an afﬁne variable is ex-
pressed in the rule (T-XA), which types a variable x in the
context of the single afﬁne assumption x. To prevent vari-
ables from being used more than once, other rules, such as
(T-APP), are forced to split the afﬁne assumptions between
their subexpressions. Afﬁne assumptions are added to A by
(T-ABS) using the function a(x;k), where x is the argument
to the function and k is the kind of its type. If the argument
x’s type has kind A then it is added to the assumptions, oth-
erwise it is not. The function p(A) is used to determine the
afﬁnity qualiﬁer of the function’s type: if no afﬁne assump-
tions from the environment are used by the function (A is ),
then it is unrestricted; otherwise it has captured an assump-
tionfromtheenvironmentandshouldbecalledatmostonce
to prevent duplicate uses.
Rule (T-AFN) allows afﬁne assumptions to be forgotten,
e.g., so that (T-XA) can always be applied with a single
assumption, or similarly, so that rule (T-X), which types un-
restricted variables, can be applied with no assumptions.
Next, we consider how the rules make use of single-
ton types to give unique type-level names to automaton in-
stances. Rule (T-NEW) grants its expression type ta, where
the name a uniquely identiﬁes the automaton; recall from
Section 3 that protected values will refer to this name a
in their types (e.g., Protected Int a). Moreover, the effect
a ]e in the conclusion of (T-NEW) ensures that this name
is disjoint from all other names e that have already been
used. Rule (T-ABS) associates the effect of its body with
the function’s type, and (T-APP) ensures that the effects of
both subexpressions and the function itself are disjoint.
Notice in (T-NEW) that a must be a type variable that
has been introduced into the context, which can either be
generalized by a type abstraction, or is part of the top-level
environment G. Extending lAIR with support for recursion
7G;A `S e :t;e An expression e has type t in environment G with afﬁne assumptions A and generates type names e.
G `S G(x) ::U
G; `S x : G(x);
(T-X)
G;x `S x : G(x);
(T-XA)
G;A `S e :t;e G `S t ::U G(a) = N
G;A `S new e : !ta;a ]e
(T-NEW)
G `S tx :: k G;x :tx;A;a(x;k) `S e :te;e q = p(A)
G;A `S lx:tx:e : q((x:tx)
e !te);
(T-ABS) where
a(x;A) = x a(x;U) = 
p(A) = ! p() = 
G;A `S e : q((x:t0)
e !t);e1 G;A0 `S e0 :t0;e2
G;A;A0 `S e e0 : [x 7! e0]t;e ]e1]e2
(T-APP)
G;A `S e :t;e
G;A;A0 `S e :t;e
(T-AFN)
G;A `S e :ta;e
G;A `S e :t;e
(T-DROP)
G `S t :: K A type t has kind K.
G(a) = k
G `S a :: k
(K-A)
G `S t :: A G `S a :: N
G `S ta :: A
(K-N)
G `S t ::U
G `S !t :: A
(K-AFN)
G `S t :: k G;x :t `S t0 :: k0 k;k0 6= N 8a 2 e:G `S a :: N
G `S (x:t)
e !t0 ::U
(K-FUN)
G `S t ::t0 ! K G;Afﬁne(G) `S e :t0; / 0
G `S t e :: K
(K-DEP)
Figure 6. Static semantics of lAIR (Selected rules)
would likely necessitate using existential quantiﬁcation to
abstract names in recursive data structures, as well as a
means to forget names whose data goes out of scope (e.g.,
as in each iteration of a loop); supporting such extensions is
straightforward [Pratikakis et al., 2006]. (T-DROP) allows
the name associated with a type to be dropped. This is con-
venient for writing functions that need to inspect the state of
an automaton without actually causing any transitions. This
rule is sound because although the name a of a type ta can
be dropped, a cannot be reused as the type-level name of
any other automaton (i.e., e is unaffected).
Finally, the fact that lAIR is a dependent type system ap-
pears in the conclusion of (T-APP)—we substitute the ac-
tual argument e0 for x in the return type—and in the kinding
rules (K-FUN) and (K-DEP), discussed momentarily.
In the kinding judgment, the rule (K-A) is standard. (K-
N) allows a name to be associated with any afﬁne type t.
This restriction is acceptable since we only want to give
names to the type of an automaton state, which will always
be afﬁne. A more general form in which a name can also be
associated with U-kinded types poses no problems, but we
omit this for simplicity. Also notice that (K-N) precludes
having named names, but does not rule out types such as
(ta)b. Although we do not use the latter in our encodings,
it can potentially be useful to, say, compose multiple au-
tomata policies and associate the composition with some
data. (K-AFN) checks an afﬁnely-qualiﬁed type: types such
as !!t are not well-formed. (K-FUN) ensures that neither the
argument or the return type of a function has the kind of a
type name. Type names are not inhabited by any value. (K-
FUN) also ensures that no free names appear in the effect
annotation e. Finally, (K-DEP) checks the application of a
dependenttypeconstructor. Here, wehavetoensurethatthe
type of the argument e matches the type of the formal. In
the second premise, Afﬁne(G) stands for all afﬁne assump-
tions in G. Since e is a type-level expression and is never
reduced at runtime, it is permitted to use afﬁne assumptions
that may have been used elsewhere.
4.3 Dynamic semantics
The dynamic semantics of lAIR deﬁnes a standard call-
by-value, small-step reduction relation for a purely func-
tional language, using a left-to-right evaluation order. The
full deﬁnition can be found in Appendix A. The form of the
relation is shown below.
M ` e
l  !e0
This judgment claims that a term e reduces in a single step
to e0 in the presence of a model M that interprets the base
terms in a signature. The security-relevant reduction steps
are annotated with a trace element l, which is useful for stat-
ing our security theorem. In this section, we brieﬂy discuss
the form of the model M and the trace elements l and state
our type soundness result.
Following a standard approach for interpreting constants
in a signature [Mitchell, 1996], we deﬁne a model M by ax-
iomatizingthereductionsofbasetermapplications. Inprac-
tice, we would implement the model in a real programming
language. For example, we could do this in FABLE [Swamy
et al., 2008], a language we speciﬁcally designed for pro-
gramming policy functions that may coerce one protected
type to another (like Conf coalition) or may produce un-
forgeable certiﬁcates (like acts for). Axiomatizing M keeps
the current presentation simpler.
A model M contains equations B : D ; e, where D is a
sequence of types and values. An example of an equation
8is leq : 4; 3 ; ? indicating that the expression (leq 4 3)
reduces to ?. We also need a mechanism to construct a
value that represents a certiﬁcate for a valid inequality; i.e.,
a value that inhabits the type LEQ 3 4. In practice, we
could use any value to represent a successful check, e.g.,
leq : 3; 4 ; true. However, to show the standard subject
reduction result, we need to give a concrete representation
to certiﬁcates in our semantics. For this purpose, we extend
the core language to include an additional construct [[B]]D,
to denote a certiﬁcate generated by the application of the
base term B to the types and values in the sequence D. An
example of a certiﬁcate value is [[leq]]3;4 which can be typed
as LEQ 3 4.
The security-relevant actions in a program execution
are the reduction steps that correspond to automaton state
changes. As indicated earlier, each transition and release
rule in a policy will be translated to a function-typed base
term like Conf coalition. Thus, every time we reduce an ex-
pression e using a base term equation B : D ; e0, we record
l = B : D in the trace: i.e., M ` E e
l  !E e0, where E is an
evaluation context.
The statement of our type soundness theorem shown be-
low relies on a deﬁnition of consistency of a model M with
a signature S. Informally, every base term in S must have an
interpretationinM andineachreductionequationB:D ;e
the expression e should have the type dictated by the sig-
nature. The full deﬁnition, together with the proof of the
following theorem, can be found in our technical report.
Theorem (Type soundness). Given a set of name con-
stants G = a1::N;:::;an::N such that G; `S e : t;e, and an
interpretation M such that M and S are type-consistent,
then 9e0:M ` e
l  !e0 or 9v:e = v, or e0 = ?. Moreover, if
M ` e
l  !e0 then G; `S e0 :t;e.
5 Translating AIR to lAIR
In this section, we show how we can translate an AIR
class to a signature in lAIR. We start by completing the
presentation of the prelude signature. Then we show how
policy-speciﬁc constructs like release rules and transition
rules are encoded as functions in lAIR and revisit the exam-
ple program from Figure 4 to show how it can be veriﬁed
by the lAIR type system. Finally, we discuss our main se-
curity theorem that claims that type-correct lAIR programs
use their AIR API correctly.
5.1 Representing AIR primitives
In addition to support for integers and pairs discussed in
Section 4.1, the prelude also includes constructs that deﬁne
AIR principals, classes and class instances, and means to
associate data with its protecting instance.
Principals. The nullary constructor Prin is used to type
principal constants P; i.e., (Prin::U);(P:Prin). As with in-
tegers, we need a way to test and generate evidence for acts-
for relationships between principals. We include the depen-
dent type constructor and runtime check shown below.
(ActsFor::Prin ! Prin !U)
(acts for:(x:Prin) ! (y:Prin) ! ActsFor x y)
AIR classes. A class consists of a class identiﬁer id
and a principal P that owns the class. The type con-
structors (Id::U);(Class::U) are used to type identiﬁers
and classes. Classes are constructed using the data
constructor (Class:Id ) Prin ) Class). The transla-
tion of an AIR class introduces nullary data constructors
like US Army Conﬁdential:Id, from which we can construct
the class USAC = Class fUS Army Conﬁdentialg fUS Armyg
where US Army is a Prin-typed constant. Finally, we use a
dependent type constructor and runtime check to generate
evidence that two classes are equal.
(IsClass::Class ! Class !U);
(is class:(x:Class) ! (y:Class) ! IsClass x y)
Class instances. Instances are typed using the Instance::U
type constructor. Each instance must identify the class it
instantiates and the current state of its automaton. For each
state in a class declaration, we generate a data constructor in
the signature that constructs an Instance from a Class and
any state-speciﬁc arguments. For the example policy we
have:
Init:Class ) Instance;Debt:Class ) Int ) Instance
Thus the expression new Init fUSACg constructs a new in-
stance of a class. According to (T-NEW), this expression
has type !Instancea, for some unique name a. As we will
see, the name a allows us to associate this automaton in-
stance with the data it protects, while the afﬁne qualiﬁer
will ensure that state transitions are tracked properly.
An afﬁne automaton instance may only be used once, so
functionsthatoperateoninstancesoftenreturnthembackto
thecallerforfurtheruse. Forexample, considerthetypeand
data constructors for producing evidence that an instance is
within a particular state:
InState::!Instance ! Instance !U
in state:8a::N:(x:!Instancea) ! (y:Instance) !
(z:!Instancea InState z y)
The function in state produces evidence of type
InState a s that some automaton a is in a particular state
s. The ﬁrst argument of the InState type constructor is an
automaton instance with type !Instance; rule (T-DROP) can
produce a value of this type from one of type !Instancea.
The second argument to the type constructor is a term of
9type !Instance, e.g., Init fUSACg. Thus no new automaton
need be created to check the state of the ﬁrst argument.
Since class instances are represented using values with
afﬁne type, in state returns the ﬁrst argument back to the
caller. However, in state cannot return a normal pair of
values because the evidence it returns is dependently typed
(the z in the ﬁrst element is bound in the second element, to
show that its state is equal to the second argument). Such
support for dependently-typed tuples, which we designate
with symbol , can be easily encoded using polymorphic
functions [Swamy et al., 2008].
Object-oriented programming languages often type in-
stances using the class name; e.g., objects of class C are
given type C. By contrast, our prelude gives all instances,
regardless of their class, the type Instance, and we rely a
runtime check to examine the class of an instance, since
we expect that class information about foreign requests
is unlikely to be known at compile-time. The function
class of inst extract a Class value c from an instance named
a and produce evidence of type ClassOf a c that a is an
instance of c.
ClassOf::N ! Class !U
class of inst:8a::N:(x:!Instancea) !
(!Instancea (c:ClassClassOf a c))
As with in state, class of inst returns the afﬁne argument x
back as the ﬁrst element of the returned pair. The second el-
ement of the pair is a dependently-typed tuple that packages
class c with the desired evidence.
As outlined in Section 3, and described further in the
next subsection, rule transitions are implemented as func-
tions that take an automaton instance as an argument, and
produce a new instance as a result (i.e., the next state). Im-
portantly, both the input and output instances to these rules
are labeled with the same singleton type name a. With this
factinmind, thekindsgiventotheClassOf andInStatecon-
structors illustrate an important difference between the roles
of singleton types and dependent types in our encoding—
the former identiﬁes the past and future instances that de-
scribe the states of a single automaton, while the latter only
refers to a single automaton state. For example, suppose we
have a class instance a with type !Instancea. The relation-
ship between values of type !Instancea and the class they
instantiate is constant. If a is an instance of the class c and a
state transition produces a new value a0 : !Instancea, then a0
is also an instance of c. Thus values of the type ClassOf a c
still witness of this relationship. However, we cannot do the
same for InState. It might be the case that a is in the Init
state, whereas a0 is in the Debt state. Therefore, we make
InState a dependent type constructor that references the par-
ticular state variable rather than indexing it with a singleton
name.
Protecting data. Finally, we need a way to associate a class
instance with the data it protects. We include the following
type constructor for this purpose (Protected::U ! N !U).
A term with type Protected t a is governed by the policy
deﬁned by an automaton instance with type !Instancea. We
do not provide a data constructor for this type. Instead, we
include the following function which can be used to protect
a value x of any type a using any name b.
(protect:8a::U:8b::N:(x : a) ! Protected a b)
Since there is no data constructor, values of type
Protected a b cannot be destructed directly (say, via pat-
tern matching in a case-statement), preventing the program
from circumventing the policy. Instead, the signature must
include functions that permit access to the underlying val-
ues only after producing evidence that the program is acting
for a principal associated with the protecting class. Such
functions could provide access in several ways: they could
return protected data with its original type, they could in-
voke a higher-order function on the data, etc. We have ex-
plored such functions in our work on FABLE, and do not
consider them further here [Swamy et al., 2008].
5.2 Translating rules in an AIR class
Our technical report [Swamy and Hicks, 2008] deﬁnes
a translation procedure from an AIR class declaration to a
lAIR signature. Space constraints preclude a full presenta-
tion of the translation judgment here. Instead, we discuss
the signature that is generated for the policy of Figure 3.
Release rules. Each release rule r in a class declaration is
translated to a function-typed constant fr in the signature.
At a high-level, the rules have the following form. In re-
sponse to a request to release data x, protected by instance
a, to an instance a0, the programmer must provide evidence
for each of the conditions in the rule r. If such evidence can
be produced, then fr returns a new state for the instance a,
downgrades x as speciﬁed in the policy and returns x under
the protection of a0. As an example, consider the type of the
Conf coalition rule shown below.
Conf coalition :
1 8src::N:dst::N:8a::U:
2 (s:!Instancesrc) ! (ClassOf src USAC) !
3 (x:Protected a src) ! (d:!Instancedst) !
4 (dst class : Class) ! (ClassOf dst dst class) !
5 (ActsFor (principal dst class) Coalition) !
6 (count : Int) ! (InState s (Debt fUSACg fcountg)) !
7 (LEQ count 10) !
8 (!Instancesrc!Instancedst Protected a dst)
These ﬁrst four lines of this type are common to all the
rules from our example policy. In this type src and dst are
type names for the source automaton instance and destina-
tion instance; a is the type of the data x that is to be re-
10leased. At line 2, we have the argument s, the source au-
tomaton, and evidence that this automaton is an instance of
the USAC class. On line 3 we have the argument x that is
the data that is protected by the src automaton and the des-
tination automaton d. At line 4 is an argument dst class
and evidence that that the dst automaton is an instance of
this class. At line 5 we have evidence for the ﬁrst condition
expression, which requires that the owning principal of the
destination automaton acts for the Coalition principal. Evi-
dence for the second condition expression is on line 6 which
shows that the source automaton is in the Debt(count) state
for some integer count. The ﬁnal condition which proves
that count  10 is on line 7.
The three-tuple returned by this function has two main
features. The ﬁrst component contains a value of type
!Instancesrc which represents the next state of the automa-
ton. In this case, the implementation of Conf coalition
would construct the state Debt fUSACg fcount +1g. Since
the value s passed in as an argument has an afﬁne type, it
is no longer usable in the caller’s context. After calling this
function, the returned instance will be the only one usable
withs’stype. Theotherimportantelementofthereturntype
is the ﬁnal component. It contains the data value x, down-
graded according to the policy and with a type showing that
it is protected by the dst automaton.
Transition rules. Each transition rule r in a class declara-
tion is also translated to a function-typed constant fr in the
signature. However, instead of downgrading and coercing
the type of some datum x, a transition function only returns
the new state of the source automaton and an unchanged
destination automaton. As an example, consider the type of
the Conf init rule shown below. (The ﬁrst four lines are the
same as the type for Conf coalition.)
Conf coalition : ::: !
5 (InState s (Init fUSACg)) ! (!Instancesrc!Instancedst)
5.3 Programming with the AIR API
The following example program, a revision of the pro-
gram in Figure 4, illustrates how a client program interacts
with the API generated for an AIR policy.
1 let a1:!Instancesrc = new DebtfUSACgf0g in
2 let a1, , a1 class ev = class of inst [src] s in
3 let x a1 = protect [src] [Int] 0 in
4 let a2:!Instancedst, channel = get request () in
5 let a2, ca2, a2 class ev = class of inst [dst] a2 in
6 let a1, a1 state ev = in state [src] a1 (DebtfUSACgf0g) in
7 let debt ev = leq 0 10 in
8 let a1’,a2,x a2 = Conf coalition [src][dst][Int] a1 a1 class ev
9 x a1 a2 a2 class ev a1 state ev debt ev in
10 send [Int] [dst] channel x a2
At line 1 we construct a1 a new automaton instance
with type !Instancesrc. At line 2 we generate evidence
a1 class ev that a1 is an instance of the USAC class. At
line 3 we certify that x a1 is an integer protected by the src
automaton. At line 4 we receive a request to release x a1 to
the automaton a2. Line 5 looks up the class ca2 of the au-
tomaton a2 and generates ClassOf evidence, a2 class ev.
At lines 6 and 7 we check that the src automaton a1 is in
Debt state with the total risk debt not greater than the bud-
get. If we are successful in constructing all the evidence,
on lines 8-9 we call the Conf coalition function, instantiat-
ing the type variables, passing in the automata, the data to
be downgraded and evidence for all the release conditions.
We get back the new state of the src automaton a1’, the un-
changed destination automaton a2 and x a2 which has type
Protected Int dst. Finally, we can give the channel a type
such as Channel Int dst, and send a type such as
8a::U;b::N:Channel a b ! Protected a b ! Unit
This ensures that x a1 cannot be sent on the channel. But,
if we are able to call Conf coalition successfully, then the
downgraded x a2 has type Protected Int dst which can be
sent.
5.4 Correctness of policy enforcement
In this section, we present a condensed version of our
main security theorem and discuss its implications. The full
statement and proof can be found in our technical report.
Theorem (Security). Given all of the following: (1)
an AIR declaration D of a class with identiﬁer C
owned by principal P, and its translation to a signature
SD; (2) a type consistent model MD for SD; (3) G =
src::N;dst::N;s : !Instancesrc; (4) G;s `S0;SD e : t;e where
src 62 e; and (5) M ` ((s 7! v)e)
l1  !e1:::
ln  !en where v =
new Init fClass fCg fPgg. Then the string l1;:::;ln is ac-
cepted by the automaton deﬁned by D.
The ﬁrst condition relies on our translation judgment that
produces a signature SD from a class declaration D. The
second condition is necessary for type soundness. Condi-
tions (3) and (4) state that e is a well-typed expression in a
context with a single free automaton s:!Instancesrc and two
type name constants src and dst. By requiring that src 62 e
we ensure that e does not give the name src to any other
automaton instance. This theorem asserts that when e is re-
duced in a context where s is bound to an instance of the
C class in the Init state, then the trace l1;:::;ln of the re-
duction sequence is a word in the language accepted by the
automaton of D.
The trace acceptance judgment has the form A;D j=
l1;:::;ln;A0, which informally states that an automaton de-
ﬁned by the class D, in initial state A, accepts the trace
11l1;:::;ln and transitions to the state A0. Recall that the
trace elements li record base terms B that stand for security-
relevant actions and sets of values that certify that the ac-
tion is permissible. The trace acceptance judgment allows
a transition from A to A0 only if each transition is justiﬁed
by all the evidence required by the rules in the class. This
condition is similar to the one used by Walker [2000].
6 Related Work
The speciﬁcation and enforcement of policies that con-
trol information release has received much recent attention.
Sabelfeld and Sands [2005] survey many of these efforts
and provide a useful way of organizing the various ap-
proaches. AIR policies address, to varying degrees, the
what, who, where and when of declassication, the four di-
mensions identiﬁed by Sabelfeld and Sands. Most of this
work approaches information release from the perspective
of information ﬂow policies [Denning, 1976], and most of
the proposed security properties can be thought of as bisim-
ulations. By contrast, our security theorem states that the
program’s actions are in accord with the prescribed policy,
and not that these actions enforce a higher-level security
property (like noninterference). We believe that the two
approaches are complementary. In combination, we could
show a noninterference-like security theorem (e.g., nonin-
terference until conditions [Chong and Myers, 2004], or ro-
bust declassiﬁcation [Zdancewic and Myers, 2001]) while
being able to reason that a high-level protocol for releasing
information is correctly followed.
Because AIR information release policies are deﬁned
separately from programs that use them, they can be rea-
soned about in isolation. Most related work embeds declas-
siﬁcation policies within programs that use them, obscuring
high-level intent. One exception is work on trusted declas-
siﬁers [Hicks et al., 2006]. Here, all possible information
ﬂows are speciﬁed as part of a graph in which nodes con-
sistofeitherdowngradingfunctionsorprincipals, andedges
consists of trust relationships. Paths through the graph in-
dicate how data may be released. AIR classes generalize
this approach in restricting which paths may occur in the
graph, and in specifying release conditions in addition to
downgrading functions.
Chong and Myers [2004] propose declassiﬁcation poli-
cies as labels consisting of sequences atomic labels sepa-
rated by conditions c. Initially, labeled data may be viewed
with the privileges granted by the ﬁrst atomic label, but
when a condition c is satisﬁed, the data may be relabeled
to the label in the sequence, and viewed at its privileges.
Declassiﬁcation labels are thus similar to AIR classes, with
the main difference that our approach is more geared toward
run-time checking: we support dynamically-checked condi-
tions (theirs must be provable statically) and run-time labels
(theirs are static annotations).
Security automata were ﬁrst proposed by Schneider
[2000] as a means of specifying and enforcing safety prop-
erties. AIR policies are actually a more general form of
security automata called edit automata Ligatti et al. [2003]
because they may modify data before releasing it. Walker
[2000]deﬁnesatype-basedapproachtoenforcesecurityau-
tomata policies. Walker’s approach embeds the deﬁnition
of the automaton in the type checking judgment, whereas
our compilation-based approach allows policies to be eas-
ily deﬁned separately. Moreover, like most work on apply-
ing automata-based policies (e.g., as surveyed by Erlings-
son and Schneider [2000]), our approach allows separate
automata to be associated with the data they protect, track-
ing the state of each automaton separately. Erlingsson and
Schneider identify the inability to do this as a main obsta-
cle towards making their system a practical tool. To our
knowledge, no prior work has used automata to specify the
protection level (and release conditions) of senstive data.
There has also been much work on tracking the state of
objects in types, dating back to Strom and Yemini [1986].
The calculus of capabilities [Crary et al., 1999] provides a
way tracking the typestate, using substructural and single-
ton types to account for aliasing. The Vault [DeLine and
F¨ ahndrich, 2001] and Cyclone [Jim et al., 2002] program-
ming languages implement type state checkers in a practi-
cal setting to enforce proper API usage and correct manual
memory management, respectively. lAIR’s use of single-
ton and substructural types is quite close to these systems.
lAIR’s use of dependent types permits more precise speci-
ﬁcations, e.g., to support certiﬁcate-based evidence.
Most of the technical machinery used in lAIR is stan-
dard, but we have not seen lAIR’s particular combination of
features. Aspinall and Hoffmann [2004] provide a good in-
troduction to dependent types and Walker [2004] describes
substructural types. Our method of generating fresh names
for singleton types is based on a similar approach for nam-
ing locks in our formalism for correlation analysis, as ap-
plied to race detection [Pratikakis et al., 2006].
7 Conclusions
This paper has presented AIR, a formal language for de-
scribing information release policies in terms of security
automata, and lAIR, a core formalism for a purely func-
tional programming language into which AIR policies can
be compiled and proven to be correctly enforced. Our work
takes an important step toward building software that can
be veriﬁed to correctly enforce high-level information re-
lease policies common to many organizations, such as the
military, and the healthcare and ﬁnancial industries. In fu-
ture work, we plan to explore the implementation of our ap-
proach in the context of securing web applications [Swamy
et al., 2008].
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A Full semantics of lAIR
13G;A `S e :t;e An expression e has type t in environment G with afﬁne assumptions A and generates names e.
S(B) =t
G; `S B :t;
(T-B)
G `S G(x) ::U
G; `S x : G(x);
(T-X)
G;x `S x : G(x);
(T-XA)
G;A `S e :t;e G `S t ::U G(a) = N
G;A `S new e : !ta;a ]e
(T-NEW)
G `S tx :: k G;x :tx;A;a(x;k) `S e :te;e q = p(A)
G;A `S lx:tx:e : q((x:tx)
e !te);
(T-ABS) where
a(x;A) = x a(x;U) = 
p(A) = ! p() = 
G;A `S e : q((x:t0)
e !t);e1 G;A0 `S e0 :t0;e2
G;A;A0 `S e e0 : [x 7! e0]t;e ]e1]e2
(T-APP)
G;A `S e :t;e
G;A;A0 `S e :t;e
(T-AFN)
G;A `S e :ta;e
G;A `S e :t;e
(T-DROP)
G;a::k;A `S e :te;e q = p(A)
G;A `S La::k:e : q(8a::k:te);e
(T-TAB)
G;A `S e : q(8a::k:t0);e G `S t :: k
G;A `S e [t] : [a 7!t]t0;e
(T-TAP)
G `S t :: k k 6= N
G; `S ? :t;e
(T-BOT)
G;A `S e :t0 )t;e
G;A0 `S e0 :t0;e0
G;A;A0 `S e fe0g :t;e ]e0 (T-CAP)
G;A `S e :te;e ; `S ti :: ki 8i:a(xi;ki) 2 A00   ! x :t;A00 ` epat :te;
G;  ! x :t;A0;A00 `S e0 :t;e0 G;A0 `S e00 :t;e00
G;A;A0 `S case e of   ! x:t:epat : e0 else e00 :t;e ](e0[e00)
(T-CASE)
G `S t :: K A type t has kind K.
G(a) = k
G `S a :: k
(K-A)
G `S t :: A G `S a :: N
G `S ta :: A
(K-N)
S(T) = K
G `S T :: K
(K-TC)
G `S t ::U
G `S !t :: A
(K-AFN)
G;a::k `S t :: k
G `S 8a::k:t ::U
(K-ALL)
G `S t :: k G;x :t `S t0 :: k0 a 2 e ) G `S a :: N
G `S (x:t)
e !t0 ::U
(K-FUN)
G `S t :: k ! K G `S t0 :: k
G `S t t0 :: K
(K-TAP)
G `S t ::t0 ! K G;Afﬁne(G) `S e :t0;
G `S t e :: K
(K-DEP)
G `S t :: k G `S t0 :: k0 k v k0
G `S t )t0 ::U
(K-CON) where U < A
Syntactic values and base-term models.
equation E ::= D ; e
eqn. domain D ::= v jt j D;D j 
interpretation M ::= B :
  !
E j M;M
extended expressions e ::= ::: j [[B]]D
values v ::= B j [[B]]D j lx:t:e j La::k:e j v fv0g j new v
evaluation contexts E ::=  j  e j v  j  [t] j  feg j v fg j case  of::: j new 
G;A ` e :t;e Static semantics for extended expressions.
G;A `S [[B]]D v :t;e
G;A `S [[B]]D;v :t;e
(T-3)
G;A `S [[B]]D [t] :t0;e
G;A `S [[B]]D;t :t0;e
(T-4)
G;A `S B :t;e
G;A `S [[B]] :t;e
(T-5)
M ` e
l  !e0 Given an interpretation M of a signature, an expression e reduces to e0 recording l in the trace.
M ` e
l  !e0 e0 6= ?
M ` E e
l  !E e0
(E-CTX) M ` e
l  !?
M ` E e
l  !?
(E-BOT)
e0 = (x 7! v) e
M ` lx:t:e v !e0 (E-APP)
e0 = (a 7!t)e
M ` La::k:e [t] !e0 (E-TAP)
if (v  epat : s) then e = s(e0) else e = e00
M ` case v of   ! x:t:epat : e0 else e00 !e
(E-CASE) B :
  !
E 2 M
M ` B ![[B]]
(E-DEL)
D;v ; e 2
  !
E l = B : D;v
M;B :
  !
E ;M0 ` [[B]]D v
l  !e
(E-BAPP)
D;v ; e 62
  !
E
M;B :
  !
E ;M0 ` [[B]]D v ![[B]]D;v
(E-B2)
D;t ; e 2
  !
E l = B : D;t
M;B :
  !
E ;M0 ` [[B]]D [t]
l  !e
(E-B3)
D;t ; e 62
  !
E
M;B :
  !
E ;M0 ` [[B]]D [t] ![[B]]D;t
(E-B4)
v  ep : s Pattern matching data constructors.
v  v :  (U-ID) v  x : x 7! v (U-VAR) v  e :: s v0  s e0 : s0
v fv0g  e fe0g : s;s0 (U-CON)
Figure 7. Static and dynamic semantics of lAIR
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